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In 2010, Congress passed a comprehensive health care reform law: the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).1  Buried deep within the PPACA 
is section 4207, a little-noticed provision that amended the Fair Labor Standards 
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 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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Act (FLSA) to provide protections for some women to express milk at work.2  
Section 4207 borrows concepts from existing labor standards and employment 
discrimination laws to offer job-protected break time and space-related 
accommodations for breastfeeding purposes.  These protections are designed to 
achieve public health goals and are therefore different than prior federal 
employment laws. 
Rather than establish labor standards or antidiscrimination protection for all 
workers with caregiving or other personal needs, Congress created protections 
for a relatively small subgroup of individuals: non-exempt working women who 
choose to express milk for children under the age of one.3  In so doing, the 
PPACA promotes specific behavior (breastfeeding) by offering workplace 
protections to a subset of workers (low-income mothers4) for  
health-based reasons.  Essentially, the law is intended to encourage low-income 
women to breastfeed, rather than to address historical discrimination or barriers 
to employment for this group of workers or working mothers generally.  
Nonetheless, the PPACA has antidiscrimination implications. 
The use of employment law to promote public health is not novel, but the 
decision to place breastfeeding protections in this framework must be considered 
within the larger context of employment law.  In its examination of this new law, 
this Article places section 4207 in the broader civil rights context and builds 
upon scholarship that argues that the physical space and structure of the 
workplace have perpetuated discrimination against women and people with 
disabilities.5  The Article also contributes to the discussion of the 
interdisciplinary nature of employment law by asserting that section 4207 
 2. Id. § 4207 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (Supp. V 2012)). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1).  A “non-exempt” employee is entitled to certain protections under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), such as a guaranteed minimum wage and overtime pay.  See 
infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text. 
 4. See BRANDON ROBERTS, ET AL., THE WORKING POOR FAMILIES PROJECT, LOW INCOME 
WORKING FAMILIES: THE GROWING ECONOMIC GAP 2 (Winter 2012-2013), available at 
http://www.workingpoorfamilies.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Winter-2012_2013-WPFP-
Data-Brief.pdf (defining “low-income” as earning less than 200% of the poverty threshold); see 
also Federal Poverty Guidelines, Families USA (Feb. 2014), http://familiesusa 
.org/product/federal-poverty-guidelines (comparing the 2014 and 2013 federal poverty guidelines); 
Workplace Flexibility 2010 & Urban Institute, Lower-Wage Workers and Flexible Work 
Arrangements 1–3, http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads/Lower-Wage%20Workers 
%20and%20FWAs.pdf (describing different definitions that capture the “low-income” workers 
population).  See infra notes 112–118 and accompanying text (explaining how the law is limited 
by class even though it does not explicitly state that it is limited to “low-income mothers”). 
 5. See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A Disability Paradigm of 
Sex Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2008) (discussing the theory that physical 
space promotes discrimination against people with disabilities and members of other protected 
groups); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1044 & n.11 
(2004) (arguing that the physical structure of a building may discriminate against people with 
disabilities). 
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represents a new approach to employment law: promoting social and economic 
equity in the workplace while simultaneously encouraging breastfeeding among 
low-income, working mothers by making it possible for them to do so at work.6 
The PPACA provides an ideal opportunity to examine how legislation aimed 
to achieve goals outside the civil rights context may still nonetheless effectively 
address historical discrimination and societal oppression.  The employment 
provisions of this new law represent a shift away from traditional labor standards 
designed to improve employment conditions for all workers and traditional 
employment discrimination provisions used to address historic discrimination 
toward regulating the workplace for a public health purpose directed only at a 
small group of people.  Admittedly, this law may not be the dawning of a new 
frontier.  However, its unique combination of protections and its focus on one 
particular class of workers facilitates the consideration of whether the 
government should enact workplace legislation to promote healthcare-based 
conduct.  This Article considers, and ultimately rejects, the incorporation of 
limited employment rights that place symbolic requirements—without more—
on employers for a public health purpose. 
Part I discusses the legislative history of the PPACA, focusing on the 
government’s continued support for breastfeeding and the barriers facing 
women who want to breastfeed and retain employment, specifically low-income 
women.  Part II describes the relevant provisions in the PPACA and analyzes 
the provisions’ break time allowance and designation requirements for a location 
to express milk, the law’s enforcement options, the Department of Labor’s 
clarification of the law, and the case law interpreting the provisions thus far.  
Part III theorizes that these provisions represent a new combination of traditional 
labor standards and accommodations to address employment barriers to low-
income, working women who choose to breastfeed in their newborns’ first year 
of life.  Finally, Part IV rejects this type of piecemeal approach to employment 
law. 
 6. See generally., Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1963 (2013) (noting the use of other types of legislation to achieve the traditional goals of 
employment law). 
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I.  BREASTFEEDING AT WORK BEFORE THE PPACA 
A.  Breastfeeding Benefits and Medical Recommendations 
The benefits of breastfeeding are no longer in dispute and are well 
documented elsewhere.7  Breastfeeding has recognized nutritional,8 physical,9 
physiological,10 and psychological11 benefits for nursing women.  Similarly, 
 7. See, e.g., OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
YOUR GUIDE TO BREAST FEEDING 4 (2011), available at http://www.womenshealth 
.gov/publications/our-publications/breastfeeding-guide/BreastfeedingGuide-General-English.pdf 
(describing the benefits breastfeeding offers to children).  Discussion of formula is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
 8. American Academy of Pediatrics, Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk, 115 
PEDIATRICS e827, e827 (2012), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content 
/115/2/496.full.pdf+html (discussing the nutritional value of breast milk). 
 9. Lara M. Gardner, A Step Toward True Equality in the Workplace: Requiring Employer 
Accommodation for Breastfeeding Women, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 266–67 (2002) (observing 
that physical benefits to breastfeeding mothers include a lower risk of breast, uterine, and ovarian 
cancers; an easier ability to “expel the placenta after birth;” and a decreased chance of diabetes or 
a “delay in the onset of subsequent diabetes for the gestational diabetic”); Heather M. Kolinsky, 
Respecting Working Mothers With Infant Children: The Need for Increased Federal Intervention 
to Develop, Protect, and Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 333, 338 (2010) (noting that physical benefits to breastfeeding mothers include lower 
blood sugar over time); Matthew L. Williams, Note, Let ‘Em Work, Let ‘Em Nurse: 
Accommodation for Breastfeeding Employees in West Virginia, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 1017, 
1020  (2009) (noting that physical benefits to breastfeeding mothers include faster loss of pregnancy 
weight, reduction in postpartum bleeding and anemia, and reduction in bone loss and chance of 
post-menopausal hip fractures and osteoporosis). 
 10. Shana M. Christrup, Breastfeeding in the American Workplace, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 471, 477 (2001) (stating that the physiological benefits of breastfeeding “include 
greater bonding between the mother and child, greater confidence in parenting skills, and an 
increase in self-esteem related to the attainment of those parenting skills”); see also Williams, supra 
note 9, at 1020. 
 11. Gardner, supra note 9, at 267–68 (explaining that the psychological benefits of 
breastfeeding include “increased self-confidence and accelerated bonding between the mother and 
her infant”). 
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breastfed children also experience a range of health benefits.12  Together, these 
benefits improve public health and result in significant health care savings.13 
Further, breastfeeding is a free source of food and nutrition, which results in 
significant savings for individual mothers and families.14  Increased 
breastfeeding in certain populations may also result in financial savings for the 
government.  For example, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants and Children (WIC) provides free formula to low-income 
women.15  In fiscal year 2009, WIC spent $850 million to provide this formula.16  
Thus, the government also has a financial interest in promoting breastfeeding 
because encouraging new mothers to breastfeed might reduce this cost. 
 12. Henry Wyatt Christup, Litigating a Breastfeeding and Employment Case in the New 
Millennium, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263, 263 (2000) (noting that breastfed children experience 
lower rates of “bacterial infections, botulism, diarrhea, respiratory illnesses, viral infection, 
allergies, and sudden infant death syndrome”); Gardner, supra note 9, at 268–69 (reporting that 
breastfed children may contract fewer ear and urinary tract infections); Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 
337–38 (same); Williams, supra note 9, at 1020 (same).  As breastfed children age, they are less 
likely to get diabetes, be overweight, or contract certain cancers.  Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 338; 
Williams, supra note 9, at 1020.  Breastfed children also experience shorter duration and decreased 
severity of illnesses, should they occur.  Gardner, supra note 9, at 270–71; Kolinsky, supra note 9, 
at 337–38.  For example, breastfed babies under the age of one are less likely to die of Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome.  Gardner, supra note 9, at 269–70; Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 337–38; 
Williams, supra note 9, at 1020.  Finally, breastfeeding has been connected to higher cognitive 
development, better sight, and quicker speech development.  Christup, supra, at 265; Maureen E. 
Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating Male: Biology, Gender, and Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 875, 888 (2005). 
 13. See U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS TO SUPPORT AND 
PROTECT BREASTFEEDING 3 (2010), available at http://www.usbreastfeeding.org 
/Portals/0/Publications/Workplace-Background-2010-USBC.pdf (exploring how breastfeeding is a 
matter of public health); see also Stephanie Sikora, Note, A Permission Slip to Breastfeed: 
Legislating a Mother’s Choice in Pennsylvania, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 781, 782–83 
(2010) (quoting Jacqueline H. Wolf, What Families Can Do for Breastfeeding and What 
Breastfeeding Can Do for Feminists, 31 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 397, 410 (2006)) 
(“[C]lassify[ing] the United States’ low breastfeeding rates as a ‘public health challenge’”).  If all 
mothers breastfed their children, at least one billion dollars in health care costs would be saved 
annually.  Christrup, supra note 10, at 477; Christup, supra note 12, at 266.  Another estimate 
calculates $13 billion in health care savings annually if ninety percent of new mothers breastfed.  
U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra. 
 14. Cf. Why Breastfeeding is Important, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://www.womenshealth 
.gov/breastfeeding/why-breastfeeding-is-important/ (last updated Aug. 4, 2011) (estimating that 
“formula and feeding supplies can cost well over $1,500 each year”). 
 15. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UPDATING THE USDA NATIONAL BREASTFEEDING CAMPAIGN 
5 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13235 (“WIC provides 
participants with supplemental foods, nutrition education[,] and referrals to health and social 
services in addition to breastfeeding promotion and support.”).  According to the Institute of 
Medicine, “breastfeeding is a priority for everyone involved with WIC [and a]ll mothers are 
encouraged to breastfeed unless medically contraindicated.”  Id. at 8. 
 16. Ruth Marcus, A Lobbying Formula for Deficit Disaster, WASH. POST, July 14, 2010, at 
A19. 
                                                 
334 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:329 
The combined impact of these benefits is among the reasons the American 
Academy of Pediatrics recommends exclusive breastfeeding for six months and 
continued provision of breast milk for at least one year.17  Similarly, the World 
Health Organization recommends some level of breastfeeding until children are 
at least two years of age.18  The medical community does not dispute that 
breastfeeding is important. 
Despite the known benefits and specific medical recommendations, the 
initiation and continuation rates of breastfeeding have varied over time and 
remain low.  Recent data reflects that the overall rates for both initiation and 
continuation of breastfeeding are improving, however.19  Currently, 
approximately seventy-five percent of new mothers start breastfeeding.20  Yet, 
the percentage of women who are breastfeeding at six months and twelve months 
is significantly lower.21  These numbers depend on a variety of factors, including 
marital status, race, education, class, and employment status.  Generally, older, 
educated, married, wealthier women have the highest rates of initiation and 
continuation of breastfeeding.22  By contrast, less educated, single, non-white, 
lower-income mothers have the lowest rates of initiation and continuation.23  
While no population has consistently met the medical recommendations for 
breastfeeding, women living at or below poverty level breastfeed at a lower rate 
than women in any other economic cohort.24  Low-income women also continue 
 17. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 8. 
 18. Health Topics: Breastfeeding, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/topics 
/breastfeeding/en/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); accord Innocenti Declaration On the Protection, 
Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/programme/breast 
feeding/innocenti.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Innocenti Declaration] (“As a global 
goal for optimal maternal and child health and nutrition, all women should [breastfeed infants 
exclusively] from birth to 4-6 months of age.  Thereafter, children should continue to be breastfed 
. . . for up to two years of age or beyond.”). 
 19. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., BREASTFEEDING REPORT CARD—UNITED STATES, 2012 (2012), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/2012BreastfeedingReportCard.pdf.  The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s National Immunization Survey  has collected the initiation 
and longevity rates of breastfeeding since 2001.  Id. 
 20. FAQs: Break Time for Nursing Mothers, U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., http://www.dol. 
gov/whd/nursingmothers/faqBTNM.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 346. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Breastfeeding, Ever (Percent), HEALTH INDICATORS WAREHOUSE, 
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Breastfeeding-ever-percent_1147/Profile/Data (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
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breastfeeding—at both the six-month25 and twelve-month marks26—at a lower 
rate than other women. 
B.  Barriers to Breastfeeding at Work 
One significant factor in the variation of breastfeeding rates across different 
populations of women is employment outside of the home.  Less than twenty 
percent of women continue breastfeeding after returning to work full time, and 
only ten percent of women continue to breastfeed after six months (the medically 
recommended minimum length of time to breastfeed).27  This is problematic for 
a government that is concerned about public health, health care costs, families, 
businesses, and the economy. 
There is a direct relationship between breastfeeding and employment.  The 
way many workplaces and work schedules are prohibits breastfeeding.28  
Workplace structures often include scheduling inflexibility,29 lack of break time 
and control over when break time may be used,30 insufficient privacy,31 lack of 
support from supervisors and coworkers,32 and problems with storage of pump 
and milk supplies.33  These workplace obstacles are problematic for all 
breastfeeding workers, but they are even more difficult to overcome for hourly 
workers.  Unlike workers in professional occupations, who may have their own 
offices with doors that can be closed for privacy, hourly workers face not only 
 25. Breastfeeding, at 6 Months (Percent), HEALTH INDICATORS WAREHOUSE, 
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Breastfeeding-at-6-months-percent_1148/Profile/Data 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 26. Breastfeeding, at 1 Year (percent), HEALTH INDICATORS WAREHOUSE, 
http://www.healthindicators.gov/Indicators/Breastfeeding-at-1-year-percent_1149/Profile/Data 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 27. Christrup, supra note 10, at 480. 
 28. See id. at 480–81 (describing several studies of breastfeeding and the workplace). 
 29. Gabriela Steier, Womenomics for Nursing Growth: Making the Case for Work Time 
Flexibility and Mother-Friendlier Workplaces, 21 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 119, 135 
(2013) (“Nonetheless, breastfeeding duration remains low, in part due to inflexible work schedules 
. . . .”). 
 30. Brit Mohler, Note, Is the Breast Best for Business?: The Implications of the Breastfeeding 
Promotion Act, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 155, 159 (2011) (observing that “insufficient break 
time” creates a deterrent to breastfeeding in the workplace); see also Elsie M. Taveras et al., 
Clinician Support and Psychosocial Risk Factors Associated with Breastfeeding Discontinuation, 
112 PEDIATRICS 108, 113 (2003). 
 31. See, e.g., Salz v. Casey’s Marketing Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 WL 2952998, at 
*1 (N.D. Iowa July 19, 2012) (alleging that a camera was installed in the room in which the 
employee pumped breast milk, without her knowledge). 
 32. FAQs: Break Time for Nursing Mothers, supra note 20 (“Returning to an unsupportive 
work environment [is] a major reason for the avoidance or early abandonment of breastfeeding.”). 
 33. KATHERINE R. SHEALY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE CDC 
GUIDE TO BREASTFEEDING INTERVENTIONS 7 (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov 
/breastfeeding/pdf/breastfeeding_interventions.pdf. 
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inflexible schedules, but also a greater unavailability of privacy and facilities in 
which to pump and store breast milk in the workplace.34  Further, if a nursing 
worker cannot find a way to express at work, it influences her ability to express 
at other times.  Because a woman’s milk supply diminishes if she cannot 
breastfeed at continuous, comfortable, and regular intervals, a woman cannot go 
a full day at work without breastfeeding without decreasing, and ultimately 
ending, her ability to do so outside of work.35 
Irregular expression also has a direct impact on a woman’s body.  For 
example, the inability to breastfeed regularly is painful.36  Milk collects in a 
woman’s lactiferous ducts, and her body anticipates that it will be expressed 
regularly.37  If it is not, the nursing mother may experience pain from the built-
up milk supply.38  Further, the lack of expression of milk results in engorgement, 
which in turn leads to blocked milk ducts and may possibly cause “infection or 
mastitis” and embarrassment.39 
Consequently, studies show that the more hours a woman works, the less 
likely she is to breastfeed.40  Moreover, an inflexible workplace may cause a 
nursing worker to wean a child off of breast milk earlier or to choose not to 
 34. Lisa Hansen, Note, A Comprehensive Framework for Accommodating Nursing Mothers 
in the Workplace, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 885, 893–96 (2007) (observing that low-wage workers “not 
only lack privacy and adequate breaks, they are also more likely to be subject to harassment for 
expressing milk at work”).  See generally LIZ WATSON & JENNIFER SWANBERG, FLEXIBLE 
WORKPLACE SOLUTIONS FOR LOW-WAGE HOURLY WORKERS (2011) (describing disparities in the 
experiences of low-wage and other workers with respect to flexible scheduling, and other 
workplace structures). 
 35. Christup, supra note 12, at 266 (explaining that milk production is an “intricate process 
of supply and demand which necessitates breastfeeding or pumping at regular intervals”); Williams, 
supra note 9, at 1020–21 (observing that the “production of breastmilk is a supply and demand 
system . . . a woman’s supply of breastmilk will literally dry up if she is unable to nurse or pump 
for periods of eight hours or more for several consecutive days”).  Once milk production stops, it 
does not commence again unless the woman goes through childbirth again.  See Gardner, supra 
note 9, at 261; Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 337. 
 36. Christup, supra note 12, at 266. 
 37. See Breastfeeding: Helpful Tips, COMPREHENSIVE WOMEN’S HEALTH SERVS., 
http://comprehensivewomenshealthservice.com/?page_id=153 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 38. See id. 
 39. Michelle A. Angeletti, Workplace Lactation Program: A Nursing Friendly Initiative, 31 
J. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES ADMIN. 223, 230 (2008); see also Jacobson v. Regent Assisted 
Living, Inc., No. CV-98-564-ST, 1999 WL 373790, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999) (describing the 
plaintiff’s feelings of embarrassment after leaking at work); U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra 
note 13, at 5–6 (describing the impact of missing even one session of expressing milk).  Mastitis, 
which may result from failing to regularly express milk, is “a painful swelling and inflammation of 
the breasts.”  Id. at 6. 
 40. See, e.g., Laura Duberstein Lindberg, Women’s Decisions About Breastfeeding and 
Maternal Employment, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 239, 241 (1996) (discussing the “linear 
relationship between hours of employment and breastfeeding continuance”). 
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breastfeed at all.41  The decisions to return to work and to discontinue 
breastfeeding are often dependent on each other.42 
The dominant workplace culture in America increases the potential for 
embarrassment.  Workers are hesitant to use words such as “breast,” “lactation,” 
“expression,” “milk,” or other related terminology, especially with coworkers 
and supervisors of the opposite sex, in part “because of heightened sensitivity to 
the possibility (or perception) of sexual harassment.”43  This concern that talking 
about breasts would sexualize the workplace influences the way breastfeeding 
is perceived at work. 
This concern is not unfounded.  Workers have been harassed at work 
regarding breastfeeding.44  Supervisors and coworkers have made comments 
about growth in the size of a nursing worker’s breasts because of breastfeeding.45  
Colleagues have “mooed” at nursing workers.46  Nursing workers have been told 
that they will “smell like curdled milk” or will be “dripping wet.”47  In addition, 
breastfeeding workers have been deprived of the ability to change clothing if 
leakage occurred.48  There are also countless stories of coworkers, bosses, 
customers, and others walking in on nursing workers while they were pumping, 
with their breasts exposed.49  These experiences emphasize that the structure and 
 41. See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO SUPPORT BREASTFEEDING 14 (2011) [hereinafter 
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION], available at http://www.surgeon 
general.gov/library/calls/breastfeeding/calltoactiontosupportbreastfeeding.pdf. 
 42. Lindberg, supra note 40, at 248 (“[T]he decisions to start work and stop breastfeeding are 
made simultaneously.”). 
 43. U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra note 13, at 4; see also Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 360 
(“[W]omen’s breasts carry a stigma of sexuality, sensuality, physicality, and desire.  While there is 
nothing sexually explicit about breastfeeding, it carries the same stigma [and] often requires a 
woman to expose some part of her breast.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, On the Job, Nursing Mothers are Finding a 2-Class System, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A1 (describing the experience of a dental hygienist whose supervisor “wore 
a Halloween costume consisting of a large silver box . . . with a cutout labeled ‘insert breast here’” 
when she pumped at work). 
 45. See, e.g., Donaldson v. American Banco Corp., Inc, 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (D. Colo. 
1996) (reporting that one employee told another “Jesus, Patty, your tits are huge!”). 
 46. See, e.g., Falk v. City of Glendale, No. 12-CV-00925-JLK, 2012 WL 2390556, at *1 (D. 
Colo. June 25, 2012). 
 47. Donaldson, 945 F. Supp. at 1462. 
 48. See, e.g., Falk, 2012 WL 2390556, at *1; Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., CV-
98-564-ST, 1999 WL 373790, at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999) (noting that the plaintiff alleged that she 
was denied break time and “forced to sit on [a] plane drenched in breast milk”). 
 49. See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc, 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that 
individuals attempted to enter the room in which the plaintiff was pumping with a key on more than 
one occasion); Heidi Blake, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable 
Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www 
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1507 (“[O]n several occasions, 
[coworkers] blew past my sign and walked in on me . . . .They may be doctors, but they are still my 
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culture of a woman’s workplace has a large impact on her ability to breastfeed.  
Thus, women who are unable to breastfeed at work are often faced with a 
difficult choice: keep their paychecks or breastfeed.50 
These issues are particularly significant because, for the first time, women 
constitute half of the American workforce.51  Approximately seventy percent of 
mothers are full-time workers,52 and the fastest growing segment of the 
workforce is women with children under the age of three.53  Recognizing these 
changes in workforce demographics and worker needs, as well as a documented 
colleagues, and they were pretty embarrassed at seeing my breasts exposed.”); Abbie Keibler, 
Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing 
Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!document 
Detail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1709 (“I have now had my door UNLOCKED and opened TWICE 
(both with males) who did no understand what I was doing.  It was humiliating.”); Amanda Kowski, 
Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing 
Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; 
D=WHD-2010-0003-1396 (“I was walked in on numerous times, much to THEIR 
embarrassment.”); Laura Isabel Serna, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: 
Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1479 (describing an incident 
in which the commenter’s supervisor “used his master key to walk [into her] office when the door 
was closed”). 
 50. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 268 (“Because of the positive impact breastfeeding has on 
a woman’s health, when we fail to accommodate breastfeeding in the workplace, we effectively 
force her to choose between her health and her employment.  Even worse, we also force her to 
choose between her child’s health and her employment.”); Lindberg, supra note 40, at 239 
(exploring the intersection of employment and breastfeeding). 
 51. See MARIA SHRIVER & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE SHRIVER REPORT 17 (Heather 
Boushey & Ann O’Leary eds., 2009), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2009/10/pdf/awn/a_womans_nation.pdf; see also CAROLYN B. MALONEY 
& CHARLES E. SCHUMER, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 2010 4 
(2010), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=8be22cb0-8ed0-4a1a 
-841b-aa91dc55fa81 (providing empirical data that demonstrates the shift in workforce 
demographics). 
 52. Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley: Health Care Amendment Looks Out for 
Nursing Mothers (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom 
/press/release/?id=921fc624-42df-42c8-bffe-1c9c3e941e8f. 
 53. SHEALY ET AL., supra note 33 (“Approximately 70% of employed mothers with children 
younger than 3 years work full time.  One-third of these mothers return to work within 3 months 
after birth and two-thirds return within 6 months.”). 
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business case,54 some employers have voluntarily created lactation-supportive 
workplace practices.55 
These voluntary business practices are bolstered by an increasing number of 
public policy efforts to foster a wider implementation of policies and practices 
that support breastfeeding at work.  Indeed, the federal government has 
undertaken a variety of approaches to increase the initiation and continuation 
rates of women breastfeeding by making it easier to breastfeed at work.56  For 
 54. See The Business Case for Breastfeeding, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/government-in-action/business-case-for 
-breastfeeding/business-case-for-breastfeeding-for-business-managers.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 
2014); U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra note 13, at 9–11.  Lactation programs have a strong 
return on investment because they help to increase job satisfaction, lower absenteeism and tardiness 
rates, lower health care costs, increase post-maternity reentry rates, and reduce training costs as a 
result of better retention rates.  See Gardner, supra note 9, at 271 (describing a UCLA School of 
Nursing study that found that nursing mothers had a twenty-seven percent lower rate of absenteeism 
and that “[o]ne day absences were three times more common in the mothers of formula-fed 
infants”).  An HMO study found that formula-fed children accumulated $1,435 more in health care 
claims than children who were breastfed exclusively for at least six months.  Id.  Others have noted 
the economic benefits afforded to employers by accommodating nursing workers.  See, e.g., 
Mohler, supra note 30, at 163 (observing that “notable employer benefits include fewer missed 
work days, reduced heath care costs, fewer instances of employee turnover . . . increased employee 
loyalty” and a positive reputation within the community); see also Christrup, supra note 10, at 477 
(characterizing breastfeeding as “economically frugal”). 
 55. See, e.g., Healthy Babies Make Happy Moms and Excellent Employees!, CORPORATE 
VOICES FOR WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.corporatevoices.org/lactation. 
 56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1790(a) (2006) (enacted “to promote breastfeeding as the best 
method of infant nutrition, foster wider public acceptance of breastfeeding . . . , and assist in the 
distribution of breastfeeding equipment to breastfeeding women”); DIVISION OF MATERNAL AND 
CHILD HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL’S 
WORKSHOP ON BREASTFEEDING & HUMAN LACTATION 63 (1984), available at 
http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCGG.pdf (reporting that a “national breastfeeding 
promotion initiative directed to all those who influence the breastfeeding decisions and 
opportunities of women involved in school, job training, professional education, and employment 
is needed”).  More recent policy initiatives also support breastfeeding more generally.  For example, 
the White House Task Force on Childhood Obesity supports breastfeeding-friendly policies.  EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CHILDHOOD OBESITY WITHIN 
A GENERATION 13–15 (2010), available at http://www.letsmove.gov/sites/lets 
move.gov/files/TaskForce_on_Childhood_Obesity_May2010_FullReport.pdf.  Likewise, the First 
Lady’s Let’s Move! initiative promotes breastfeeding as a method to reduce childhood obesity.  
Press Release, The White House, Office of the First Lady, First Lady Unveils Let’s Move! Child 
Care to Ensure Healthy Start for Youngest Children (June 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/08/first-lady-unveils-lets-move-child-care 
-ensure-healthy-start-youngest-ch.  Similarly, in February 2011, the IRS, for the first time, 
identified pumps and other breastfeeding supplies as medical expenses that are eligible for a tax 
deduction.  I.R.S. Announcement 2011-14 (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/a-11-14.pdf.  But see Emily F. Suski, Note, In One Place, But Not Another: When the Law 
Encourages Breastfeeding in Public While Simultaneously Discouraging it at Work, 12 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 109, 113 (2001) (observing that, by promoting breastfeeding “but failing to 
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example, Healthy People 2020, a Department of Health and Human Services 
project that develops science-based federal objectives to improve the country’s 
health,57 recently sought to increase breastfeeding rates by encouraging more 
employers to implement supportive breastfeeding policies.58  Additionally, the 
Surgeon General issued an updated “Call to Action to Support Breastfeeding” 
in 2011, which reiterated that supportive workplaces are necessary to  
“enable[] mothers to continue breastfeeding as long as they desire.”59  This call 
for supportive workplace practices echoed the World Health Organization and 
United Nations Children’s Fund’s 1990 joint policy statement, which was 
adopted by over thirty countries and contained a requirement for “imaginative 
legislation protecting the breastfeeding rights of working women and established 
means for its enforcement.”60 
C.  Early Litigation and Legislative History 
Despite efforts to encourage breastfeeding-friendly business practices and 
supportive policy initiatives, women continued to experience problems with 
breastfeeding at work, including harassment, discrimination, the denial of time 
or private space to pump, and termination from employment.  Some women 
challenged their employers’ actions.  These women brought cases under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),61 Title VII as amended by the 
encourage it in the workplace,” the law has a “fragmented approach” that “exclude[s] women from 
work”). 
 57. About Healthy People, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2020, http://healthypeople.gov 
/2020/about/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 17, 2012). 
 58. Maternal, Infant, and Child Health, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2020, 
http://healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives2020/objectiveslist.aspx?topicId=26 (last updated 
Aug. 28, 2013). 
 59. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 344 (describing an earlier blueprint effort from the Department 
of Health and Human Services).  See generally SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION, supra note 
41. 
 60. Innocenti Declaration, supra note 18; see also INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, UNICEF, 
1990–2005: CELEBRATING THE INNOCENTI DECLARATION ON THE PROTECTION, PROMOTION AND 
SUPPORT OF BREASTFEEDING vii, 11 (2005), available at http://www.unicef.org/nutrition 
/files/Innocenti_plus15_BreastfeedingReport.pdf (elaborating on UNICEF’s intent to create 
“imaginative legislation” to promote supportive workplace practices). 
 61. Before the PPACA was enacted, courts had not determined that a nursing worker was in 
the protected category for Title VII protection.  See, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 374 
F.3d 428, 439 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that a policy that prohibited 
breastfeeding in public would have a disparate impact because the policy differentiated between 
breastfeeding women and non-breastfeeding women, two subgroups of the larger protected group 
of women); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 308–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that 
the failure to provide a location in which the plaintiff could express milk was not disparate treatment 
because there was no similarly situated group of men to use as comparators); Pitts-Baad v. 
Valvoline Instant Oil Change, No. 2012 CA 00028, 2012 WL 4946433, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 
15 2012) (rejecting a sex-plus theory based on the failure to accommodate expression because it 
“would elevate breast milk pumping—alone—to a protected status”).  But see Donaldson v. 
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Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),62 the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA),63 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).64  At the time of 
American Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1463 (D. Colo. 1996) (allowing a sexual harassment 
claim to survive summary judgment). 
 62. Plaintiffs also unsuccessfully brought Title VII claims that argued that lactation was a 
“related medical condition” to pregnancy under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. 
Houston Funding II, Ltd., No. H-11-2442, 2012 WL 739494, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012) (holding 
that all “pregnancy-related conditions end[]” with the delivery and that lactation is not protected by 
Title VII), vacated, 717 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1487, 
1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that “child rearing concerns after pregnancy are not [covered] 
medical conditions”); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., No. 90-6259, 1991 WL 270823, at * 1 (6th Cir. 
Dec. 19, 1991) (holding that a breastfeeding claim under the PDA is only possible if a condition is 
medically necessary); McNill v. New York City Dep’t of Correction, 950 F. Supp. 564, 569 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding that the medical condition of the plaintiff’s son did not qualify under 
the PDA); see also Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act on the Workplace—From a Legal and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 
93, 123–24 (2005) (arguing that lactation is a pregnancy-related physical condition subject to PDA 
protection); Elissa Aaronson Goodman, Note, Breastfeeding or Bust: The Need for Legislation to 
Protect a Mother’s Right to Express Breast Milk at Work, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 146,  
157–58 (2003) (observing that “few women have made a showing that their decision to breastfeed 
was, in fact, based on a medical necessity”).  On May 30, 2013, the Fifth Circuit held that lactation 
discrimination was covered under the PDA.  Houston Funding II, 717 F.3d at 426.  Analogizing 
the physical impact of lactation to the effects of menstruation, the court held that an adverse 
employment decision motivated by lactation imposes a burden on women that men do not and 
cannot suffer, which can be the basis of a Title VII claim.  Id. at 429–30.  The court also held that, 
because lactation is a physiological condition of pregnancy, it is covered under the PDA.  Id. at 
428–29; see also Brief for Appellant at *10, Houston Funding II, 717 F.3d 425 (No. 12-20220) 
(arguing that the PDA should cover discrimination against female employees based on expressing 
milk because “[f]iring a female worker because she is lactating” is “the essence of sex 
discrimination”).  See supra note 61. 
 63. Breastfeeding does not qualify for job-protected time off under the FMLA.  See, e.g., 
Erickson v. AMN Healthcare Serv., No. 09cv910 BTM (CAB), 2010 WL 2618850, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 
June 25, 2010) (holding that “pumping breast milk is not protected by the FMLA”).  Nonetheless, 
if nursing workers can afford to take unpaid leave and are otherwise eligible under the statute, the 
FMLA may help certain women initiate breastfeeding and to continue breastfeeding during the up 
to twelve weeks of FMLA-authorized leave after the birth of a child.  29 U.S.C.  
§§ 2611(2), (4), 2612(a) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (2013).  After returning to work, eligible 
nursing employees may take leave intermittently to breastfeed in one-hour increments with their 
employer’s permission, but only to the extent the leave relates to pregnancy.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012); 29 C.F.R. § 825.203(b). 
 64. Nursing workers are not employees “with a disability” under the ADA as enacted.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 12102(2), 12111(8) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Bond v. Sterling, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 306 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (using the ADA’s definition of disability to determine that breastfeeding is not a 
disability under state law and stating that “[i]t is simply preposterous to contend a woman’s body 
is functioning abnormally because she is lactating”); Christrup, supra note 10, at 487–88 (observing 
that breastfeeding is related to pregnancy such that it is not covered under the ADA; further 
articulating some of the concerns with alleging that breastfeeding is a disability); Eldredge, supra 
note 12, at 889, 898 (same); Goodman, supra note 62, at 167–68 (setting forth arguments for and 
against ADA claims for nursing workers).  It is unclear how these cases will be interpreted under 
the ADA, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which expressly includes 
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these cases, existing federal law failed to protect nursing workers, allowing 
employment barriers to continue.65 
As these cases progressed—and ultimately failed—Congress considered 
legislation to create or clarify protections for breastfeeding workers.  This 
legislation proposed amendments to the FMLA, Title VII, or the FLSA to 
provide traditional labor standards that enable women to work while 
breastfeeding and to address the discrimination these women experienced at 
work. 
For example, in 1998, the New Mothers’ Breastfeeding Promotion and 
Protection Act was introduced, which would have amended the FMLA by 
adding lactation breaks to the list of reasons for which a covered employer had 
to provide unpaid, job-protected leave to eligible employees.66  The legislation 
also proposed the creation of a tax credit for any employer expenses related to 
providing a place for breastfeeding workers to express milk.67   
In addition, Congresswoman Carolyn D. Maloney, among others, has 
repeatedly proposed legislation to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination 
against women who are breastfeeding and to encourage employers to support 
nursing workers with tax credits.68  In 2001, Representative Maloney introduced 
physiological conditions, dictates that any such condition be assessed in its active state, and has the 
stated goal of making it easier for people to access its protections.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4)(D); 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1),(j)(1)(vii) (2013).  See generally Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, 
Pleading Durability After the ADAAA, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2013); Chai R. Feldblum, 
Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 
238–39 (2008) (discussing how the amendments seek to broaden the definition of “disability”). 
 65. By contrast, twenty-four states have laws that address breastfeeding at work.  See 
Breastfeeding Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues 
-research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx (last updated May 2011).  Many of these laws 
contain provisions that were included in proposed federal legislation.  See id.; Marcia L. 
McCormick, Gender, Family, and Work, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 309, 331–33 (2013).  Other 
state law claims also may exist.  See Suski, supra note 56, at 139–40 (describing potential tort claim 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and calling for coverage under state 
unemployment insurance systems).  But see Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs., 685 N.E.2d 
1325, 1326–27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that the breastfeeding mother’s decision to quit 
was not based on just cause); Perdrix-Wang v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 856 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1993) (en banc) (holding that quitting for the purpose of being able to breastfeed does not 
constitute good cause for unemployment compensation purposes). 
 66. See New Mothers’ Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 1998, H.R. 3531, 105th Cong. § 6 
(1998) (proposing to provide a breastfeeding worker with up to one hour per eight hour work day 
to express milk and a proportional amount of time for a shift shorter or longer than eight hours); 
see also Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, H.R. 1369 110th Cong. (2007) (expanding the 
FMLA to provide breaks unless the employer can demonstrate undue hardship); Healthy Lifestyles 
and Prevention America Act, S. 1074 109th Cong. § 217 (2005) (same). 
 67. H.R. 3531 § 4. 
 68. Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 285, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 201(a) (2001); Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001, S. 256, 107th Cong. § 2(1) (2001); Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000, H.R. 3861, 106th Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2000); Pregnancy 
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the Breastfeeding Promotion Act to prohibit discrimination against 
breastfeeding women at work and promote accommodations for the expression 
of milk at work by offering a tax credit to employers who provided a location 
for its workers to do so.69  The bill would have amended Title VII by adding 
lactation to the definition of “because of sex” or as a premise on which 
discrimination “on the basis of sex” is prohibited.70  Representative Maloney 
reintroduced the Breastfeeding Promotion Act in 2003, 2007, and 2009 and alos 
regularly reintroduced her prior legislation.71  Similarly, Senator Olympia 
Snowe repeatedly introduced the Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments, 
which contained similar language to amend Title VII.72   
Finally, in 2009, Representative Maloney and Senator Jeff Merkley 
introduced a House and Senate bill respectively that combined traditional labor 
standards and employment discrimination provisions for breastfeeding working 
women.73  These companion bills included the same provisions as 
Representative Maloney’s 2001 bill, as well as an amendment to the FLSA 
requiring employers with fifty or more employees to provide breastfeeding 
employees with break time and private areas to express breast milk.74  In 2010, 
Senator Merkley included the proposed FLSA amendment from his 2009 bill as 
part of a larger health care reform bill.75  That proposal later became section 
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000, S. 3023, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (2000); Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act Amendments of 1999, H.R. 1478, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (1999); New Mothers’ 
Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 1998, H.R. 3531, 105th Cong. § 4 (1998). 
 69. See H.R. 285 §§ 102(b), 201(a). 
 70. Id. (proposing an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
 71. Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2009, H.R. 2819, 111th Cong. (2009); Breastfeeding 
Promotion Act of 2007, H.R. 2236, 110th Cong. (2007); Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 2790, 
108th Cong. (2003); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005, H.R. 2122, 109th Cong. 
(2005); see also bills listed supra note 68. 
 72. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2003, S. 418, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2001, S. 256, 107th Cong. (2001); Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act Amendments of 2000, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 73. See H.R. 2819, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 501 (2009); S. 1244, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 501 (2009). 
 74. See H.R. 2819, §§ 101, 501; S. 1244, §§ 101, 501.  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207  
(2006 & Supp. V 2012), with S. 1244, § 501(a), and H.R. 2819, § 501(a).  Had this legislation been 
adopted, it would have been more comprehensive than the PPACA because it included mandatory 
accommodations, antidiscrimination protections, and employer incentives. 
 75. See Press Release, Breastfeeding Amendment Adopted Unanimously During Markup of 
Health Care Reform Legislation, supra note 52; Mary Agnes Carey, Phil Galewitz, & Laurie 
McGinley, Kaiser Health News, 7 Items You Didn’t Know Were in the Senate Bill, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 30, 2009 3:31:49 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34209992/nsfhealth-health-care! 
(describing the nursing workers amendment as being in the “congressional tradition” of “adding 
pet interests that otherwise might not pass to a big bill that at least will be put up for a vote”); see 
also Nicole Kennedy Orozco, Note, Pumping at Work: Protection from Lactation Discrimination 
in the Workplace, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281, 1293 (2010). 
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4207 of the PPACA, the first federal law to specifically address breastfeeding at 
work.76 
II.  THE PPACA’S CHANGES TO THE FLSA 
With the PPACA, Congress adopted traditional labor standards and 
accommodations that require employers to support women who pump milk at 
work, with the goal of promoting breastfeeding by and economic security for 
low-income workers.77 Since March 23, 2010, the PPACA has required 
employers to provide reasonable break time and a private location, other than a 
restroom, for certain employees to express milk for up to one year after a child’s 
birth.78  In December 2010, the Department of Labor (Department) issued a 
Request for Information seeking public comment and published preliminary 
guidance on a number of the new law’s provisions.79 
A.  The FLSA’s New Provisions 
The PPACA amended the FLSA to create two new rights for breastfeeding 
workers: the ability to take job-protected breaks to express milk and access to a 
private space in which to express.80 
1.  Break Time 
Section 4207 of the PPACA states that “[a]n employer shall provide a 
reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing 
child for one year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to 
express the milk.”81  The statute does not define what constitutes “reasonable 
break time” or determine how to evaluate whether a woman “needs to express” 
breast milk.82 
 76. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r).  However, every year since 1999, Congresswoman Maloney has 
included the “Right to Breastfeed Act” in the appropriations process.  KAREN M. KEDROWKI  
& MICHAEL E. LIPSCOMB, BREASTFEEDING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 65–66 (2008).  The 
Act states that “a woman may breastfeed her child on any portion of Federal property where the 
woman and her child are otherwise authorized to be.”  See Right to Breastfeed Act, H.R. 1848, 
106th Cong. § 2 (1999).  In practice, this has given federal employees a limited right to breastfeed 
at work. KEDROWKI & LIPSCOMB, supra, at 64–65. 
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r). 
 78. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r), (r)(1)(B). 
 79. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80073, 80075 (Dec. 21, 
2010).  1, 857 comments were submitted in response to this request for information; the authors 
read all publicly available comments.  Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail; D=WHD-2010-0003-0001 
(last updated Feb. 22, 2011). 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1). 
 81. Id. § 207(r)(1)(A). 
 82. See generally id. § 207(r). 
                                                 
2014] Breastfeeding and a New Type of Employment Law 345 
The Department’s preliminary interpretation of the law is that breastfeeding 
workers typically need two to three breaks during an eight-hour shift to express 
milk.83  According to the Department, the length of the break needed may vary, 
but expressing breast milk typically will take fifteen to twenty minutes.84  
Moreover, in determining what constitutes “reasonable break time,” employers 
should consider the availability of a sink and refrigerator, the time it takes to 
walk to retrieve supplies and travel to the designated space, and whether those 
supplies have to be unpacked and assembled.85  Further, the Department 
encourages employees and employers to communicate their expectations and 
develop a mutual understanding about the length and frequency of breaks taken 
for this purpose.86 
Although the PPACA does not dictate the manner in which an employee is to 
communicate her intent to exercise her rights to break time and space to express 
milk, the Department suggested that workers should “facilitate an employer’s 
ability to provide appropriate space for expressing milk” by providing employers 
with advance notice of their intent to take breaks.87  The FMLA contains a 
similar notice provision that requires employees to provide thirty days notice of 
the need for foreseeable leave.88  However, unlike the FMLA, the Department’s 
guidance does not address whether an employee should communicate with her 
employer each time she needs to use her break time for lactation or each time 
her lactation needs change.  What is reasonable or necessary for a worker 
 83. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075 (explaining that 
the Department consulted with public health officials to conclude that a nursing baby needs to feed 
every two to three hours and thus a nursing mother must continue to produce milk on a basis 
consistent with this timing or she may lose the ability to breastfeed). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  After milk is expressed by hand or pump it must be refrigerated.  Christup, supra note 
12, at 267. 
 86. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075.  Based upon 
experience with similar language in the FMLA regarding scheduling of intermittent leave, this 
proposal is likely to lead to confusion and litigation.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b) (2006) (stating that 
leave for the birth of an employee’s son or daughter or placement of a son or daughter with the 
employee for adoption or foster care “shall not be taken by an employee intermittently or on a 
reduced leave schedule unless the employee and the employer of the employee agree otherwise”). 
 87. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077; see also Miller v. 
Roche Sur. & Cas. Co., Inc., 502 F. App’x 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that an email to a 
colleague mentioning the law generally and the need for space and coverage to pump was 
insufficient notice to trigger protection under the PPACA). 
 88. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) (describing how, if the leave is foreseeable based on expected 
birth or placement, the employee shall provide the employer with not less than 30 days’ notice); 29 
U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2) (describing how, if the leave is foreseeable, the employee must make 
reasonable effort to avoid disrupting the operations of the employer). 
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breastfeeding a three-month-old child may be different than what is reasonable 
or necessary for a worker breastfeeding a ten-month-old child.89 
The Department also stated that an employer may ask an expectant mother if 
she intends to exercise her rights under the PPACA, asserting that doing so 
“informs the employee of their rights under the law.”90  This statement is 
logically flawed.  It assumes that asking an employee if she plans to take 
lactation breaks equates to notifying her of her rights to take both lactation 
breaks and to take them in a private location at her workplace.91  It also ignores 
the reality that having an employer ask this question may have the effect of 
intimidating the expecting mother into either choosing not to breastfeed or 
limiting how much she plans to breastfeed. 
Finally, the Department does not consider expressing milk to be a reason that 
qualifies an employee to take FMLA leave.92  Therefore, any break time taken 
under the PPACA will not count against any FMLA leave to which the employee 
may be entitled.93  Moreover, the Department states that an employer may 
violate Title VII if it treats employees who take breaks to express milk under the 
PPACA differently than employees who take breaks for personal reasons under 
a disparate treatment theory.94  This is important because the PPACA does not 
provide employment discrimination protection, and previous attempts to bring 
breastfeeding cases under Title VII failed.95 
2.  Private Space 
The PPACA requires all employers to provide “a place other than a bathroom, 
that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the 
public, which may be used by an employee to express breast milk.”96  The 
 89. See, e.g., Letter from Jacqueline Marlette-Boras, Director, Office of the Maryland WIC 
Program, to Montaniel Navarro, FLSA Branch Chief, Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Department 
of Labor (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD 
-2010-0003-1214 (noting the different experiences of breastfeeding infants of different ages). 
 90. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077. 
 91. The FMLA regulations regarding an employer’s duty to provide an employee notice of 
her rights under the FMLA are instructive.  See 29 C.F.R § 825.300(a)(3), (b) (2013) (describing 
an employer’s duty to post notice explaining the law’s provisions, to include notice in any employee 
handbooks, and to notify the employee of her eligibility to take FMLA). 
 92. This is because expressing milk does not constitute bonding with and caring for a newborn 
child, nor is caring for a newborn child by expressing milk deemed a serious health condition for 
the purposes of the FMLA.  Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077; 
see also supra note 63 (providing an overview of previous failed attempts to use the FMLA for this 
purpose). 
 93. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra notes 61–62 (providing an overview of previous failed attempts to use Title 
VII). 
 96. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B) (Supp. V 2012). 
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Department interprets this provision to mean that an employer should provide a 
room if possible, and, if a room is not available, use partitions and curtains to 
achieve the required privacy.97  Windows must be covered and the door should 
be locked or marked with a sign.98 
Although employers are not required to maintain a permanent room or space 
dedicated for lactation, a designated, private space must be available when 
necessary.99  The Department interprets the statute to require an employer to 
provide a space for lactation even if the employee is not at her primary work 
location, but rather is working at another location or client worksite.100  The 
Department also interprets the PPACA as requiring the provisions of a space in 
which to safely store the milk.101  While employers are not required to provide 
refrigeration, they must permit breastfeeding workers to bring a pump for 
expressing milk and an insulated container for storing the milk, as well as a place 
to store these supplies.102 
B.  Limitations on the FLSA Amendment 
The PPACA’s time and space rights are limited in three ways.  First, the law 
creates an affirmative defense for employers with fewer than fifty employees, 
which allows an employer to avoid providing time and space for lactation if 
doing so would impose an undue hardship on the business.  Second, the PPACA 
does not protect all workers.  Finally, the law offers limited remedies or means 
of enforcement if an employer violates its provisions. 
1.  The Affirmative Undue Hardship Defense 
The PPACA’s break time and space accommodation requirements are 
mandatory for employers with fifty or more employees.103  By contrast, 
employers with fewer than fifty employees need not provide these 
accommodations if they can demonstrate an undue hardship.104  The employer 
bears the burden of establishing that it qualifies for this defense vis-à-vis the 
 97. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075–76 (noting that 
the ante room or lounge area connected to a bathroom would meet the statutory requirements, 
provided that there is a wall separating the rooms; conversely, locker rooms more likely would not 
meet the requirements). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 80076. 
 100. Id. at 80077.  Although this Department guidance is helpful, it is incomplete and leaves 
many questions unanswered.  For example, although an employer is required to provide a room if 
possible, it is unclear from whose perspective “possible” is defined.  It is also unclear what “free 
from intrusion” means.  For example, it is unclear if aural privacy is required or whether a shared 
room that supports multiple employees who are or need to express milk suffices. 
 101. Id. at 80076. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (Supp. V. 2012). 
 104. Id. § 207(r)(3). 
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number of employees and that compliance with the statute’s requirements would 
meet the required level of hardship.105  With respect to calculating the number 
of employees for purposes of this defense, the PPACA adopts the FLSA’s 
definition of “employee,” which includes both full- and part-time workers.106  In 
addition, the Department instructs employers to count all employees at all work 
sites.107  With respect to demonstrating the requisite level of hardship, the 
PPACA requires a “significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation 
to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s 
business.”108  The Department believes that few employers will be successful in 
asserting this defense given the limitations in the law’s requirements and the 
high burden an employer must overcome to assert the defense.109 
2.  Eligibility Limitations 
The PPACA contains three important eligibility limitations: by class, type of 
breastfeeding, and employer size.  First, the PPACA contains two provisions that 
limit coverage by class.  The first class limitation is explicitly identified in the 
text of the statute: the protections are limited to non-exempt employees.110  A 
“non-exempt” employee is one who is not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime 
protections based on salary, position, or some other factor.111  Teachers and 
administrators in elementary and secondary schools, a large number of who are 
women of child-rearing age, also are deemed non-exempt employees.112  
Generally, non-exempt workers are hourly employees who earn less than $455 
 105. Id. 
 106. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006); § 207(r)(3). 
 107. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077. 
 108. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(3). 
 109. 75 Fed. Reg. at 80077 (“Employers with fewer than 50 employees may not presume that 
having a smaller workforce by itself sufficiently demonstrates that compliance would pose a 
significant difficulty or expense[.]”). 
 110. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006); see Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 
at 80074 (noting that only employees who are not exempt from section 7 of the FLSA are entitled 
to break time).  However, all federal workers are covered in an effort to ensure consistency.  
Memorandum from John Berry, Director, United States Office of Personnel Management to Heads 
of Executive Departments and Agencies (Dec. 22, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov 
/whd/nursingmothers/NMothersFederalEmplymnt.pdf (requiring agencies to allow exempt 
employees to use these protections “to ensure consistent treatment of nursing mothers within the 
Federal workforce”). 
 111. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a); see Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative, 
Professional, Computer & Outside Sales Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
(July 2008), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/fairpay/fs17a_overview.pdf. 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1); see Fast Facts, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATS., 
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=28 (observing that over three-quarters of public school 
teachers are women; forty-four percent of which are under the age of 40). 
                                                 
2014] Breastfeeding and a New Type of Employment Law 349 
a week and work in non-supervisory positions.113  By itself, this limitation 
excludes approximately twelve million otherwise eligible salaried women from 
qualifying for the PPACA’s breastfeeding protections.114  Despite this 
acknowledged limitation, the Department “hopes that employers will provide 
this right to express breastfeeding to all workers, regardless of [their] status 
under the FLSA.”115 
The law also implicitly limits coverage by class by providing that break time 
need not be paid.116  According to the Department, although the statute does not 
require compensation during breaks, if employers otherwise pay employees 
during breaks, “an employee who uses [her] break time to express milk must be 
paid in the same way that other employees are compensated for break time.”117  
Moreover, if the employer only permits breaks of twenty minutes or less, the 
break time must be counted as hours worked in calculating whether the 
employee has satisfied the FLSA’s minimum overtime and wage 
requirements.118  The Department also encourages employers to provide flexible 
 113. See J. Bradley Sedaris, Wage and Hour Myths: Illuminating the Truth Behind 
Misconceptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 72 ALA. LAW. 462, 465 (2011) (describing how 
a salaried worker could be a non-exempt worker). 
 114. Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Introduces Breastfeeding Legislation and 
Highlights Portland Police Bureau’s Commitment to Working Mothers (May 13, 2013), available 
at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=516937a6-9599-4f90-aad1 
-2b844883481b. 
 115. Melvina C. Ford, Senior Policy Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, 
Written Testimony for the Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and Workers with 
Caregiving Responsibilities Meeting (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/ford.cfm?renderforprint=1.  The federal 
government has elected to follow this suggestion.  See Memorandum from John Berry, Director, 
United States Office of Personnel Management to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
supra note 110. 
 116. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(2) (Supp. V. 2012). 
 117. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 80073, 80074 (Dec. 21, 
2010); Fact Sheet #73: Break Time for Nursing Mothers under the FLSA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, (Aug. 2012), http://www.dol.gov/whd 
/regs/compliance/whdfs73.pdf. 
 118. See Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075.  In addition, 
employees must be completely relieved of duty for breaks to be unpaid.  Id.  A number of comments 
submitted in response to the Department’s preliminary guidance contained statements of workers’ 
interest in doing light duty work that involved reading or using a computer while pumping.  See, 
e.g., Melanie Higgins, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break 
Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www 
.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-0099; Kerri Sullivan, Comment on the 
Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 
REGULATIONS.GOV (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD 
-2010-0003-0246; Catherine Truxillo, Comment on the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Notice: 
Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-0641. 
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scheduling for employees who seek to make up for unpaid break time used to 
express milk.119 
Second, the PPACA protects only one type of breastfeeding.  The statute 
requires employers to provide break time “for an employee to express breast 
milk.”120  However, expressing milk by pumping to preserve it for later 
consumption is only one type of breastfeeding.  The term “breastfeeding” refers 
to feeding a child via milk produced or stored in a woman’s body.  This may be 
done by expressing milk or by the process of suckling, whereby a child attaches 
to the mother’s body to eat.121  The PPACA addresses only the expression of 
milk, not suckling.122 
Third, the law uses a new type of employer threshold requirement to limit its 
scope.  Before the PPACA, federal employment and discrimination law took one 
of two approaches to limiting eligibility based on employer coverage.  One 
approach, found in the majority of federal employment laws, requires employers 
to have a defined number of employees before the substantive requirements 
apply.  For example, Title VII and the ADA only apply if an employer has at 
least fifteen employees.123  The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) only applies if an employer has at least twenty employees.124  The 
FMLA only applies if an employer has at least fifty employees in a seventy-five 
mile radius.125  The other approach applies the statute’s provisions regardless of 
the number of employees working for a particular employer.  For example, 
provisions of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act (USERRA) apply to all employers.126  By contrast, the PPACA uses a hybrid 
model by combining the two approaches.  The PPACA applies to all employers, 
 119. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80075.  The breaks must 
be paid if the employer pays employees for other break times.  Id. 
 120. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (r)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 121. Kolinsky, supra note 9, at 337 (discussing the mechanics of producing breast milk); see 
also KEDROWKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 76, at 2 (arguing that different definitions of 
“breastfeeding” may lead to varying legal consequences); U.S. BREASTFEEDING COMM., supra 
note 13, at 5–6.  Pumping devices vary in cost, speed, and size.  Id. at 6.  Other options to breastfeed 
include bringing a child to work, having someone else bring a child to work, or leaving work to go 
to a child.  KEDROWKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 76, at 16. 
 122. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A).  This also has class implications, given the expense 
associated with purchasing pumps, bottles, or other items necessary to use expression as a food 
source for a child. 
 123. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101 
-336, § 101(5)(a), 104 Stat. 327, 330 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006)). 
 124. Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11(b), 81 Stat. 
602, 605 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006)). 
 125. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101, 107 Stat. 6, 8 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
 126. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-353, § 4303, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150–51 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(a) (2006)). 
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regardless of the number of employees at a particular worksite, but the undue 
hardship defense only applies to employers with less than fifty employees.127 
Finally, all employment laws contain some type of eligibility restriction.  The 
PPACA, however, is the first law to cover such a small group of primarily low-
income workers who choose to engage in a particular activity (breastfeeding) 
that society wants to encourage by offering protections to engage in a specific 
form of that activity (expression) at work, while also allowing small employers 
to opt out of supporting the activity. 
3.  Limited Remedies and Enforcement Mechanisms 
The PPACA does not specify a penalty for an employer that violates the break 
time or space requirements.  Instead, the PPACA incorporates the FLSA’s 
penalty provision, which states: 
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 
207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected 
in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid 
overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal 
amount as liquidated damages.128 
Thus, while the FLSA provides a private right of action for employees to 
recover unpaid wages, in most instances the failure to provide lactation breaks 
or space to a nursing mother will not result in lost wages.  Typically, designated 
break time is unpaid and the failure to provide space is not associated with 
unpaid wages or other compensation.  The FLSA also imposes a civil penalty 
for willful or repeated violations that may now include violations of PPACA 
provisions.129  However, in reality, the PPACA lacks a reliable enforcement 
mechanism because there is no penalty available and proof of willful or repeated 
violations will be difficult—if not impossible—to obtain.130 
A nursing worker who has been discharged or discriminated against because 
she attempted to enforce her break time or space rights may still file a retaliation 
complaint with the Department or file a private cause of action seeking remedies 
 127. No further guidance is provided on how to count employees for this threshold.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 207(r)(3). 
 128. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 129. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2) (2006) (“Any person who repeatedly or willfully violates 
section 206 or 207, relating to wages, shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $1,100 for 
each such violation.”); see also Sarah Andrews, Lactation Breaks in the Workplace: What 
Employers Need to Know About the Nursing Mothers Amendment to the FLSA, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 121, 140 (2012) (analyzing this provision). 
 130. This limited enforcement schema was upheld in one of the few cases decided under the 
PPACA to date.  See Salz v. Casey’s Mktg. Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 WL 2952998, at *3 
(N.D. Iowa July 19, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss alleged PPACA violations because section 
216(b) limits enforcement to unpaid wages). 
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like reinstatement or lost wages.131  Additionally, if an employer refuses to 
comply with the law, a breastfeeding worker may file a claim with the 
Department, which in turn could seek injunctive relief in federal court to obtain 
reinstatement, lost wages, and access to break and space to express milk should 
it so choose.132  For example, if an employer terminates a nursing worker 
because she takes breaks to express milk or because she indicated her intent to 
take breaks to express, the Department may intervene to enforce her rights under 
the PPACA.133  Unfortunately, in reality, the combination of limited potential 
remedies and lack of enforcement resources will hamper the law’s utility. 
III.  A NEW TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW? 
By adopting these substantive rights and limitations, Congress combined a 
mix of employment law concepts to achieve the public health goal of promoting 
breastfeeding among certain low-income working mothers.  Congress could 
have supported breastfeeding in this population in a number of ways.  For 
example, Congress could have included antidiscrimination provisions for 
lactating mothers, or new moms generally, if the goal was to overcome the 
barriers described above.  Congress also could have mandated that employers 
provide on-site day care.  Yet, Congress elected not to create such 
provisions.  The inclusion of these specific provisions in the PPACA represents 
Congress’s deliberate choice about how to achieve a public health goal by 
harkening back to familiar labor standards and employment discrimination 
provisions, yet integrating these provisions in a form not yet seen before in 
employment law. 
The PPACA not only selectively borrows concepts from existing laws, but it 
also represents something rarely seen in employment law: at-work protections 
for a relatively small set of individuals to promote specific out-of-work 
conduct.134  The PPACA clearly promotes breastfeeding by requiring the 
 131. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to discharge or 
in any other manner discriminate against any employee because she has filed a complaint or 
instituted any proceeding); Ford, supra note 115; see, e.g., Boxum-Debolt v. Office of the Dist. 
Att’y, No. 12–2641–KHV, 2013 WL5466915 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2013). 
 132. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (2006); Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. 
80073, 80078 (Dec. 21, 2010); see, e.g., Salz, 2012 WL 2952998 (relying on this limitation to deny 
a private lawsuit). 
 133. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80078 (stating that this 
would violate 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2)). 
 134. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical 
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 369 (2002) (observing that “[m]ost statutes 
governing the workplace only apply within the context of the employment relationship”).  Two 
additional areas of employment law that create protections to encourage participation in behavior 
that does not relate to one’s current jobinvolve encouraging civilian participation in the militia and 
seeking services after domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, or stalking.  See, e.g., 38 
U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (providing labor standards and antidiscrimination protection “to encourage 
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provision of job protection for reasonable break time and defined space 
accommodations for low-income workers to pump milk.  These provisions—
and the failure to include others that were proffered—represent a shift in the 
purpose of employment law.  This invites the question of whether the new 
direction represented in this statute is one that should be repeated. 
A.  “Traditional” Employment Law and Theory 
Over the years, scholars and advocates have offered different classifications 
and theories to justify employment law.135  One common way to classify 
employment laws is to identify them as either traditional labor standards or as 
discrimination protections.  Traditional labor standards require an employer to 
do—or not do—something for an individual employee “as a condition of 
engaging in commerce.”136  By contrast, employment discrimination provisions 
prohibit an employer from taking actions based on an employee’s membership 
in a statutorily defined group, or from implementing a facially neutral policy that 
has a disparate impact on a statutorily defined group.137 
noncareer service in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to 
civilian careers and employment which can result from such service”); Victims’ Economic Security 
and Safety Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15 1, 3 (2009) (“[E]nabling victims of domestic or 
sexual violence to maintain the financial independence necessary to leave abusive situations, 
achieve safety, and minimize the physical and emotional injuries from domestic or sexual violence, 
and to reduce the devastating economic consequences . . . by entitling employed victims of domestic 
or sexual violence to take unpaid leave to seek medical help, legal assistance, counseling, safety 
planning, and other assistance without penalty from their employers [among other things]”). 
  Employment law arguably also has incentivized certain behavior in whistleblower 
situations.  Under whistleblower laws, employers are prohibited from retaliating against employees 
who disclose illegal, corrupt, or wasteful activity.  See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 101–12, § 3 103 Stat. 16, 29 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1218–19, 1221 (2012)) 
(providing a right of action for terminated whistleblowers).  However, whistleblower protections 
are clearly linked to employment because they encourage employees to report illegal or unsafe 
activities at their workplaces, and, thus, are distinguishable from the other non-job related behavior. 
 135. See Befort, supra note 134, at 378 (arguing that recent employment laws have either 
created minimum workplace standards or prevented employers from discriminating against 
members of a protected category); James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor 
Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 
1743 n.204 (1999) (same); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equity, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208883. 
 136. Workplace Flexibility 2010, Workplace Flexibility: An Overview of Nondiscrimination 
Models 33 (Fall 2007) (on file with authors).  Some scholars call this type of law, under which an 
employer either has the duty to act or is prohibited from acting, a “minimum rights statute” or 
“minimum standards.”  See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 120; William R. Corbett, The Need 
for A Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 130–31 (2003); Benjamin 
I. Sachs, Employment Law As Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2701–02 (2008) (comparing 
minimum rights statutes to labor law’s collective rights approach); Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum 
Wage As A Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative To Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 1, 3 (2009). 
 137. See Befort, supra note 134, at 379; Corbett, supra note 136, at 141. 
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Traditional labor standard laws include the FLSA, which requires employers, 
inter alia, to pay employees a minimum wage and overtime pay and prohibits 
child labor;138 the FMLA, which requires some employers to provide job-
protected, unpaid leave for defined family or medical reasons;139 the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), which requires employers to 
provide a safe and healthy environment by conforming to minimum 
standards;140 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which requires 
employers that provide health and retirement plans to employees to follow 
designated minimum standards;141 and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act, which requires large employers to notify employees before 
closing the business or engaging in mass layoffs.142  A labor standard may apply 
to conduct for all employees (like the OSH Act) or only for a select group of 
employees (like the FMLA).143   
Traditional employment discrimination laws include Title VII, which 
prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin;144 the ADEA, 
which prohibits discrimination based on the age of an employee or applicant 
who is at least forty years old;145 and the ADA, which prohibits discrimination 
based on the disability or perceived disability of an employee or applicant.146  
The development of disparate impact and mixed-motive theories has served to 
strengthen the effectiveness of employment discrimination laws.  Yet, these laws 
are different from traditional labor standards because they also prohibit actions 
 138. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 139. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 140. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 141. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
 142. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)); see also Evan  
Hudson-Plush, Note, WARN’s Place in the FLSA/Employment Discrimination Dichotomy: Why A 
Warning Cannot Be Waived, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2929, 2957–58 (2006) (explaining why WARN 
is a labor standard, in comparison to the FLSA).  See generally Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra 
note 136; Corbett, supra note 136, at 130–31 (“Other examples include . . . the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act (EPPA), which prohibits employers from requiring employees to take polygraph 
examinations, or from taking adverse employment actions based on the results, except under certain 
circumstances”). 
 143. Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra note 136; see also Sachs, supra note 136, at 2701–02 
(comparing labor standards to labor law’s collective rights approach). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 145. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp V 2012). 
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motivated by an employee’s membership in a protected group or employment 
policies that have a disparate impact on that group.147 
Some scholars designate accommodations as a distinct third category of 
employment law.148  Others classify accommodation provisions as a subset of 
one of the other two categories of employment law or along with the other 
employment law provisions with which they are affiliated.  Following the latter 
categorization, an accommodation provision may be a labor standard if it is 
viewed as a separate, stand-alone protection, or it may be an employment 
discrimination provision if Congress conferred the right to an accommodation 
directly in a discrimination statute.  An example of a labor standard 
accommodation is found in USERRA, which requires employers to 
accommodate a person who incurred or aggravated a disability while serving in 
the military by making “reasonable efforts” to re-qualify the person for the 
position to which he or she is entitled to return.149  The failure to provide this 
accommodation may be actionable.150  An example of an employment 
discrimination accommodation provision is found in the ADA, which defines 
“discrimination,” in part, as the failure to make a reasonable accommodation to 
an applicant or employee.151  Additionally, an accommodation provision that is 
 147. Corbett, supra note 136, at 130–31; Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1818 (2005) (“[A]ntidiscrimination 
jurisprudence . . . teaches that civil rights statutes are intended to punish bad actors instead of 
directing defendant-employers to fix broader societal wrongs”); Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 
2952–58 (“A dichotomy thus exists between labor standard statutes that set minimum standards 
and supersede contractual outcomes, and employment discrimination statutes which do not seek to 
supplant private contractual outcomes, but to eliminate wrongful conduct and barriers to labor 
market efficiency.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1403–04 
(2012); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 644–45 
(2001); Roberts, supra note 5, at 1301; Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: 
ADA Accommodations As Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 593 (2004). 
 149. 38 U.S.C. § 4313(b)(2)(B) (2006).  According to USERRA, an employee 
shall be promptly reemployed . . . (3) In the case of a person who has a disability incurred 
in, or aggravated during, such service, and who (after reasonable efforts by the employer 
to accommodate the disability) is not qualified due to such disability to be employed in 
the position of employment in which the person would have been employed if the 
continuous employment of such person with the employer had not been interrupted by 
such service– (A) in any other position which is equivalent in seniority, status, and pay, 
the duties of which the person is qualified to perform or would become qualified to 
perform with reasonable efforts by the employer; or (B) . . . in a position which is the 
nearest approximation to a position referred to in subparagraph (A) in terms of seniority, 
status, and pay consistent with circumstances of such person’s case. 
Id. § 4313(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 150. See, e.g., Brown v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (“[T]he term ‘discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability’ includes- (5) (A) not making reasonable 
accommodations . . . or (B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who 
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an employment discrimination provision may also function like a traditional 
labor standard or affirmative right.152  Similarly, some laws contain components 
of both labor standards and employment discrimination provisions.  For 
example, USERRA contains a labor standard that requires employers to provide 
up to five years of job protection to certain workers and an employment 
discrimination provision that prevents employers from taking employment 
actions because of a worker’s membership in the military.153 
Classifying a provision as either a labor standard or an employment 
discrimination provision is important because the theories underlying different 
types of employment law vary.  The main theories that have developed to defend 
and explain employment law are: to regulate the employment relationship to 
address imbalances of bargaining power, to address economic efficiency, and to 
promote social equality.  The theory that the government may regulate the 
employment relationship to address imbalances of bargaining power between 
employees and employers is often used to justify employment law, especially 
labor standards.154  This theory is most persuasive when considering laws that 
require employers to undertake costs that have a broad impact, such as minimum 
wage and overtime protections.  Commentators have clarified that “[t]hese 
minimum labor standard laws eliminate societal concerns from the competitive 
process so that employers do not compete on these standards.”155  As the Senate 
similarly explained, “labor standards take broad societal concerns out of the 
competitive process so that conscientious employers are not forced to compete 
with unscrupulous employers.”156  Additionally, labor standards are necessary 
to maximize economic efficiency.157  Indeed, some scholars argue that 
individual employment law should be evaluated by its effect on the efficiency 
of labor markets.158 
is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such 
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation . . . .”). 
 152. Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra note 136, at 24. 
 153. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (exemplifying a reemployment 
provision), with 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006) (exemplifying an antidiscrimination provision). 
 154. See Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91, 111 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 
1997). 
 155. Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 2950, 2952 (making this observation with respect to the 
FLSA and FMLA and explaining that the “fundamental difference is that labor standard  
statutes . . . are meant to supercede private contractual outcomes, while employment discrimination 
statutes are not meant to override private contracts, but to remedy a societal wrong”); see also 
Corbett, supra note 136, at 128 (explaining that the FLSA “established minimum rights,” such as 
“‘a minimum wage, a maximum number of hours before overtime was due, and minimum wages 
for engaging in work and for certain types of work’”). 
 156. S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7. 
 157. Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 106. 
 158. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Keith W. Chauvin, Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A 
Framework for Analyzing Employment Law Issues, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 1, 4 (1999); Seth 
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Conversely, the main theory justifying employment discrimination provisions 
is the advancement of social equality by increased access to the workplace for 
historically disadvantaged groups.159  This theory posits that some employer 
costs are justified to promote social equity.  Historically, commentators have 
defended employment discrimination provisions as a mechanism to address 
systemic patterns of stigma and subordination by targeting a practice of 
discrimination and occupational segregation that supports those patterns.160  
Under this theory, employment discrimination provisions and workplace 
accommodations are necessary to overcome systemic patterns of stigma and 
subordination. 
Employment law scholars also debate whether accommodation and 
employment discrimination provisions are distinct concepts.161  Many scholars 
argue that employment discrimination requirements and accommodation 
mandates are different because employment discrimination provisions prohibit 
employers from acting on prejudice, whereas accommodations prohibit 
employers from acting on their desire to save money.162  Others argue that the 
ADA accommodation and antidiscrimination provisions are similar because 
both seek “to overcome systemic patterns of stigma and subordination by 
targeting a practice of occupational segregation that undergirds those 
patterns.”163  In this view, an accommodation is a discrimination requirement 
with which “employers make individualized changes in facially neutral rules, 
structures, or tasks to enable a protected class member to perform a given job 
and produce as much output as non-accommodated coworkers.”164 
This theory is also used to justify Title VII and the expenses incurred by 
employers subjected to them.165  The legislative history of employment 
discrimination statutes typically identifies the historical discrimination and 
subordination of members of the targeted groups in society and at work, and 
statistical and other documentation of the stigma and the long-term economic 
impact of workplace exclusion and discrimination that contributed to  
D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 19, 37 (2000). 
 159. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics 
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2003). 
 160. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 134, at 392. 
 161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 147 (highlighting the distinction between 
antidiscrimination and accommodation approaches and observing that courts seem uncomfortable 
with the accommodation approach). 
 163. Bagenstos, supra note 159, at 830. 
 164. Id. at 836. 
 165. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2479, 2479–81 (1994); Befort, supra note 134, at 400. 
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class-based inequality.166  These statutes address systemic, class-based 
subordination through the provision of accommodations and protections from 
discrimination at work for groups who have experienced discrimination based 
on membership in a protected category.  Consequently, some scholars assess 
their effectiveness in terms of achieving social equity.167  Therefore, 
accommodations may be a form of antidiscrimination requirements that 
recognize that it is sometimes necessary to make structural changes to the 
workplace to achieve the goal of overcoming past discriminatory animus 
through meaningful inclusion. 
Some scholars have postulated that this theory has two variations: the 
difference model and the sameness model.  The difference model of equality 
posits that differential or preferential treatment may be necessary to ensure 
equality; the sameness model of equality posits that employees should be treated 
the same regardless of their membership in a protected class.168  Title VII is an 
example of an employment discrimination statute that attempts to address 
historical societal discrimination by requiring employers to treat employees the 
same regardless of gender, race, color, national origin, or religion.169  The ADA 
incorporates both a sameness model, by prohibiting covered employers from 
treating individuals with disabilities differently from similarly situated 
individuals, and a difference model, by providing preferential treatment in the 
form of a reasonable accommodation.170  The ADA represents both models, 
recognizing that, in some instances, differential treatment of individuals with 
disabilities is necessary to ensure equal opportunity and to address historical 
barriers to access to the workplace.171 
Other approaches to employment discrimination law involve the application 
of the antisubordination and anticlassification principles to constitutional equal 
protection law.172  The antisubordination theory asserts that social stratification 
 166. See Abrams, supra note 165, at 2479–81 (discussing the stigma and gender-based 
discrimination that women may face in the workplace); Befort, supra note 134, at 365–66 
(providing demographic data for workers in 1950). 
 167. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 134, at 458 (describing the narrow impact of the Equal Pay 
Act); Abrams, supra note 165, at 2479–80 (describing Title VII and the theory of equality for 
women in employment). 
 168. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1996). 
 169. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under 
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2004). 
 170. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Ball, supra note 173, at 955 
(citing Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 168, at 10–11); see also Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
125 F.3d 1019, 1021–22 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the ADA contains “distinct” disparate 
treatment and failure to provide reasonable accommodation claims). 
 171. Ball, supra note 173, at 955. 
 172. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Rights Tradition: Anticlassification 
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 12 (2003). 
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prevents true equality and that equal access to rights and privileges, such as 
employment and employment discrimination law, should address social 
stratification by providing protections to historically oppressed groups.173  By 
contrast, the anticlassification principle asserts that the government should not 
classify individuals on the basis of group identification.174  Both theories argue 
that, historically, employment discrimination law was best explained by 
antisubordination theory, but that the anticlassification principle more accurately 
explains recent discrimination laws.175 
Finally, employment laws have also been used to challenge the male worker 
norm by attempting to address the reality that the workplace remains designed 
for male workers, as reflected in work hours, wages, structures, and other 
disadvantages to caregivers, including breastfeeding mothers.176 
B.  Analyzing the PPACA with a Labor Standard Lens 
The PPACA contains elements of both labor standards and employment 
discrimination provisions.  Despite the incorporation of these concepts, the 
PPACA cannot be justified by the employment law theories underlying 
traditional labor standards; it simply does not fit within the economic efficiency 
or regulation to address bargaining imbalances theories. 
The PPACA’s breastfeeding provisions, placed in a federal healthcare law, 
are intended to promote breastfeeding.  The PPACA achieves this goal through 
provisions that resemble labor standards.  Requiring employers to comply with 
some statutorily defined floor of rights involving the hours and location of work 
is a classic labor standard provision. 
Yet, the PPACA is different than most labor standards.  One difference relates 
to the small group of workers who are afforded these rights based on employee 
choices: the choice to have children and the choice to breastfeed.  Further, the 
PPACA limits its protections to those in a strategically defined group.  This is a 
discrimination concept—not a labor standard concept.  Indeed, “outside of the 
antidiscrimination precinct, individual employment law does not protect 
particular classes or axes of identity.  Its protections are, in an important sense, 
 173. Id. at 9. 
 174. Id. at 10. 
 175. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 
ALA. L. REV. 955, 975–76, 983–87 (2012) (arguing that recent changes to the ADA, Title VII, and 
the enactment of the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act reflect a shift in statutory equality law toward 
anticlassification values by emphasizing anticlassification provisions and deemphasizing certain 
antisubordination provisions). 
 176. The “ideal worker” is a worker “who works full time and overtime and takes little or no 
time off for childbearing or child rearing.”  JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 1 (2000); see 
also Robin R. Runge, Redefining Leave From Work, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 445,  
445–47 (2012); Joan Williams, Market Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. 
REV. 305, 311–18 (1999). 
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universal.”177  Similarly, in some respects, employment discrimination 
provisions are a type of traditional labor standard that relate to a protected 
group.178  Applying this principle to the PPACA moves the law outside of 
traditional labor standard territory.  At its core, the PPACA provisions only 
apply to a particular type of worker: non-exempt breastfeeding mothers with 
children under the age of one. 
However, if the failure to provide universal coverage systematically precludes 
a statute from qualifying as a labor standard, it would be problematic for the 
FMLA, which is frequently used as one of the model labor standard statutes.179  
Although the groups covered by the FMLA are different than the group defined 
in the PPACA, the FMLA contains its own, much-criticized eligibility 
restrictions, such as the failure to cover small employers, part-time workers, or 
most contingent workers (all of which are covered under the PPACA), as well 
as the failure to provide wage replacement or coverage for caregiving 
generally.180  These limitations, including their disproportionate impact on 
women, are the subject of continued debate.181  Nonetheless, they cannot 
automatically be the basis of classifying a law differently. 
Moreover, the quintessential labor standards law—the FLSA—uses group 
membership for certain protections.182  While some of the FLSA’s protections 
are universal (like the prohibition on using child labor or minimum wage 
protections),183 the FLSA also contains exemptions to the overtime provisions, 
which have been expanded through regulatory interpretation over the years.184  
These exemptions exist because, in the 1930s, Congress observed that 
employees who made a particular wage or had managerial experience had 
different needs than those without these characteristics.185  These are the very 
 177. Bagenstos, supra note 135, at 105. 
 178. See, e.g., Workplace Flexibility 2010, supra note 136 (noting that labor “standards may 
serve as alternatives to nondiscrimination models, or nondiscrimination models might serve as 
complements to or components of a labor standard.”). 
 179. See, e.g., id.; Corbett, supra note 136, at 130–31. 
 180. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A)–(B) (2006); see also Michelle A. Travis, What A Difference 
A Day Makes, or Does It? Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1223, 1250–51 & n.155 (2010) (listing articles in which “scholars have criticized the FMLA for its 
limited coverage on a variety of different grounds” that and summarizing their respective critiques 
of these limitations). 
 181. See, e.g., Runge, supra note 176, at 449–50; Travis, supra note 180, at 1232–34. 
 182. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(1) (2006) (exempting some classes of employees from 
benefiting from minimum wage and maximum hour requirements). 
 183. 29 U.S.C. § 212(a)–(b) (2006) (child labor); 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (minimum wage). 
 184. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1–17); 29 C.F.R. § 541 (2013). 
 185. See Garrett Reid Krueger, Comment, Straight-Time Overtime and Salary Basis: Reform 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (1995); see also Hansen, supra 
note 34, at 907 (observing that “women who are most vulnerable to loss of income, especially the 
working poor, would be unable to afford unpaid breaks and might forego expressing milk”); Harry 
G. Hutchison, Waging War on “Unemployables”? Race, Low-Wage Work, and Minimum Wages: 
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same class-based exemptions that are incorporated into and limit the PPACA,186 
so they cannot be used as the basis for declaring that the PPACA is not a 
traditional labor standard any more than they are used to declare that the FLSA 
is not a traditional labor standard.  However, the PPACA’s limitations go further 
than the FLSA’s.  Even with their coverage limitations, traditional labor 
standards affect the entire workforce.  The FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime 
provisions apply to all employees who are non-exempt.  Similarly, the FMLA 
applies to all employees who experience serious health conditions or need to 
care for a family member with one and then it has coverage limitations.  The 
PPACA provisions are different by requiring unpaid break time and a location 
for a very small population of workers for a limited purpose and for a limited 
time. 
Accordingly, because the PPACA resembles a traditional labor standard, 
while also looking like something else, it is helpful to examine the theories that 
justify labor standards to determine whether the PPACA can be classified as a 
labor standard.  Arguably, the PPACA is designed to maximize economic 
efficiency.  Requiring employers to provide break time and a location to express 
milk during work hours is economically efficient because it enables a segment 
of the workforce to return to work after giving birth and maintain full-time 
employment.  Without the ability to express milk at work, many new mothers 
are unable to return to the workforce.  Losing these productive employees and 
expending the costs to recruit, hire, and train new employees is not cost 
efficient.187  The PPACA responds to the failure of the free market and former 
public policies to alter workplace structures to allow breastfeeding workers to 
remain employed.  In this way, the PPACA regulates the employment 
relationship by providing standards and accommodations to improve retention 
and lower turnover. 
Similarly, the PPACA maximizes economic efficiency by providing an undue 
hardship defense.  The defense exempts small employers from the PPACA’s 
break time and space requirements if they are unduly burdensome after 
The New Evidence, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 46–47 (2011) (noting the FLSA’s “explicit 
commitment to low-wage workers” and a potential antipoverty justification for the law). 
 186. 29 U.S.C. § 213.  An effort is underway to make these protections less class-based by 
expanding them to salaried workers.  See Supporting Working Moms Act 2013, S. 934, 113th Cong. 
(2013); Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, H.R. 1941, 113th Cong. (2013).  One of the bill’s 
sponsors estimates that this would “expand [the PPACA’s provisions] to cover approximately 12 
million salaried women who work in traditional office environments.”  Press Release, Senator Jeff 
Merkley, supra note 114.  There are also current proposals to create other protections to achieve 
integration and attachment of working parents and pregnant working women, in particular.  See, 
e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 1975 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring employers to 
provide the same types of accommodations for pregnant women as people with disabilities get 
under the ADA); Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 942 113th Cong. (2013) (same). 
 187. See supra note 54 (summarizing the business case for breastfeeding-supportive 
workplaces). 
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consideration of the relevant cost, employer size, and efficiency.188  However, 
the limited scope of the PPACA significantly limits any possible economic 
efficiency.  Further, the potential economic advantage an employer otherwise 
may gain is limited by the space requirement, the loss in productivity of an 
employee during the time of expression, and her travel time to and from the 
designated expression location. 
However, the PPACA rectifies economic imbalances in the same way as the 
FLSA.189  The FLSA was meant “to correct and as rapidly as practicable to 
eliminate” work “conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the 
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-
being of workers.”190  The sponsors of the PPACA used a similar rationale.  
Specifically, members of Congress sought to advance the public health benefits 
of mothers who breastfeed their children by ensuring that breastfeeding mothers 
can express at work.191  Moreover, the targeting of non-exempt employees also 
indicates that the PPACA addresses imbalances of bargaining power between 
low-income employees and their employers.  However, the limited scope of the 
PPACA’s labor standard weakens this argument. 
The law’s ability to mitigate the imbalance of bargaining power between 
employees and employers is also undercut by its failure to include a strong 
enforcement mechanism.  Both the government and individuals, through 
litigation and other means, usually enforce traditional labor standards when 
necessary.  For example, employees who are denied FMLA leave have a private 
right of action against their employers to seek redress and obtain relevant 
remedies.192  Similarly, the FLSA, the OSH Act, and USERRA all provide a 
private right of action or an administrative complaint process through which 
employees may enforce underlying substantive rights and obtain relevant 
remedies.193  Under USERRA, the Department created a national Ombudsman 
Services Program through which a neutral and free mediator is available to assist 
 188. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (r)(3) (Supp. V 2012). 
 189. See Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 2952–58 & n. 173 (quoting Taylor v. Progress 
Energy, Inc., 415 F.3d 364, 374–75 (4th Cir. 2005)) (justifying the FMLA’s minimum leave labor 
standard because “labor standards are necessary . . . to relieve the competitive pressure placed on 
responsible employers by employers who act irresponsibly”).  But see Zatz, supra note 136, at 5 
(criticizing the economic justification of the FLSA and reframing it as a discrimination law). 
 190. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b) (2006); see Hutchison, supra note 185, at 46–47 (quoting Juan C. 
Botero, The Regulation of Labor, 119 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 1339, 1342 (2004)) (arguing that the 
law may need to intervene “to protect the interests of workers and to help assure a minimum 
standard of living . . . because ‘free labor markets are imperfect’ and provide an opportunity for 
employers to extract rents by abusing workers, which is a source of ‘injustice and inefficiency.’”); 
Krueger, supra note 189, at 1109. 
 191. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, supra note 114. 
 192. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a)(2) (2006). 
 193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 217 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 660 (2006); 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322, 4323(a) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
                                                 
2014] Breastfeeding and a New Type of Employment Law 363 
an employee in enforcing his rights or negotiating with his employer.194  The 
PPACA does not contain any of these enforcement mechanisms and relevant 
remedies, which weakens its potential status as a labor standard.195  Without an 
effective enforcement mechanism and the availability of penalties, qualifying 
workers are protected by nothing more than a symbolic statement of support.  
Consequently, the PPACA fails as a labor standard. 
C.  Analyzing the PPACA with a Discrimination Law Lens 
The PPACA does not fit as an employment discrimination law.  Although the 
PPACA may be a new type of antidiscrimination law that addresses social 
inequity by targeting a class of workers without a shared immutable 
characteristic or historical experience of workplace discrimination, it ultimately 
fails because it does not contain any antidiscrimination protections and it 
provides only defined, controlled accommodations to promote breastfeeding for 
a small subset of the worker population for a limited time period. 
The text of the PPACA explicitly fails to prohibit discrimination against 
nursing workers; breastfeeding women are still not a protected class.  Moreover, 
the PPACA does not require that employers provide an affirmative reasonable 
accommodation as developed under the ADA jurisprudence to meet the needs 
of women who are nursing or breastfeeding.  Rather, it requires employers to 
provide unpaid break time for one specified purpose, thereby defining and 
limiting what constitutes a “reasonable” accommodation for employers with at 
least fifty employees.  Also unlike the ADA, the failure to provide break time 
and appropriate space is a violation of the PPACA, it is not a cognizable form 
of discrimination against nursing workers. 
Nonetheless, the statute does borrow concepts from employment 
discrimination law.  For example, the undue hardship defense for small 
employers and the time and space labor standards can be framed as requirements 
of structural equality.196  The time and space requirements are affirmative 
accommodations under which employers must change their structures to support 
breastfeeding, similar to the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision.197  
Accordingly, some may argue that this is a stealth antidiscrimination law. 
 194. 38 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006); What is USERRA, ESGR, http://www.esgr.mil/USERRA/What 
-is-USERRA.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 195. But see Andrews, supra note 129, at 137 (observing that the FLSA’s provision of 
attorneys’ fees may incentivize litigation under this provision). 
 196. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives and Implication, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5 (2000) (noting the “structural 
equality” the ADA was designed to achieve). 
 197. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring employers to provide 
reasonable break time and a location for nursing mothers to express breast milk), with 42 U.S.C.  
§ 12111(a) (2006) (defining the “reasonable accommodations” that employers must provide to 
employees with disabilities). 
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Yet, the PPACA does not provide a traditional accommodation because it is 
not individualized (even if a woman is eligible for an accommodation because 
she is part of a defined group).  The only possible accommodation is break time 
and a location to express.  This is the strongest argument for declaring that the 
PPACA is a labor standard.  Employers need only make two defined 
accommodations; accommodations need not be further tailored to the worker.  
Time and space are it. 
Moreover, the accommodation required by the PPACA is distinguishable 
from the ADA’s accommodation in several key ways.  First, the ADA 
encourages the employer and the employee to define an accommodation that is 
most appropriate for that individual.198  Under the ADA, a request for a 
reasonable accommodation by an individual is the beginning of an informal, 
interactive process between an individual and an employer, which is used to 
determine whether a particular accommodation is reasonable for the employee 
and whether the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
employer.199  The goal of this interactive process is to find an accommodation 
that will enable the individual with a disability to perform essential job 
functions.200  This collaborative procedure is necessary because the ADA does 
not define one specific accommodation.  Instead, the law provides examples for 
guidance, such as adjustments to the workplace, changes in work hours, or a 
leave of absence.201  In practice, the interactive process creates accommodations 
beyond the provided examples.  For example, different employees with the same 
or similar disability may request different accommodations that meet their 
individual needs. 
Although the PPACA envisions that the employer and the employee will work 
together to determine the frequency and length of breaks, they are not 
encouraged to collaborate to create a different accommodation.  The PPACA 
allows for some individuality in the frequency and length of the breaks, and the 
location may vary from employer to employer, but the employee cannot be 
accommodated by being permitted to pump at home or to bring her child to work 
to suckle during breaks, or by mandating day care. 
The second key difference is that the ADA accommodation must be 
reasonable and the employer must have the ability to implement it without 
“undue hardship.”202  The PPACA’s time and space accommodations are per se 
reasonable for larger employers, but they may be an undue hardship for smaller 
employers.  In this respect, the same provision uses both a traditional labor 
standard and an employment discrimination provision depending on the 
 198. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 199. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2013). 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 202. Id. § 1630.2(o)(4); see Bagenstos, supra note 159, at 836–37. 
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employer.  The time and space requirements are traditional labor standards that 
must be provided if a nursing worker’s employer has at least fifty employees.203  
But the law contains an undue hardship affirmative defense, and the underlying 
antidiscrimination justifications for it, if the nursing mother works for an 
employer that employs fewer than fifty employees.204 
Arguably, the PPACA’s undue hardship defense represents the next evolution 
of employment law.  The fewer-than-fifty-employees requirement limits the 
defense’s applicability while simultaneously establishing that there is no viable 
defense for larger employers that fail to provide the required accommodations.  
Using the number of employees as a proxy for assessing undue hardship is a 
departure from the ADA and Title VII, which must be considered when applying 
ADA and Title VII case law to the PPACA. 
Even though these laws also contain an employee threshold requirement for 
coverage, the ADA applies to all workers with disabilities, not just those with a 
specific defined disability, and Title VII applies to all workers that are members 
of the protected class, not just those that can be classified in one type of religion. 
Because the PPACA contains semblances of employment discrimination 
protections, the theories underlying discrimination law must be analyzed to 
determine whether the PPACA is an employment discrimination law.  The 
PPACA accommodates a subgroup of individuals to promote breastfeeding 
among that group.  It also addresses a specific social inequality experienced by 
a subset of new mothers who may be unable to continue working if their 
employers do not accommodate their decision to breastfeed.  The time and place 
requirements increase the probability that this sub-group of working mothers 
will remain in the workforce.  However, the PPACA is not neutral.  The 
provisions do not provide systemic protection to all working mothers or all low-
income mothers, or all low-income mothers or all caregivers, nor does it protect 
working mothers from discrimination, regardless of whether or not they 
breastfeed.205 
Further, feminist scholars argue that ensuring inclusion of mothers in the 
workforce, thereby addressing social inequalities, requires both accommodation 
 203. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1), (3) (Supp. V 2012). 
 204. Id. § 207(r)(3). 
 205. See Zatz, supra note 136, at 23, 32 (citing Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in 
American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003); 
Athena D. Mutua, Introducing ClassCrits: From Class Blindness to a Critical Legal Analysis of 
Economic Inequality, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 859 (2008)) (raising concerns about class-based 
employment law, in part based on the “traditional hostility to class analysis”); see also Hansen, 
supra note 34, at 893–95 (describing the creation of and potential impact of a “two-tier system” of 
addressing breastfeeding based on class); Runge, supra note 176, at 470–73 (noting that the law 
does not address the documented discrimination experienced by women as caregivers). 
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of pregnancy and prohibition of pregnancy-based discrimination.206  This 
requires recognition that sex-based segregation begins with pregnancy, but 
continues through child bearing.207  Without accommodation, pregnancy causes 
women to temporarily, or even permanently leave the workforce, contributing 
to subordination of women in the workplace and the wage gap.208  Failure to 
accommodate pregnancy and child rearing limits working mothers’ abilities to 
amass the skills, expertise, and seniority necessary to progress in or pursue their 
careers.  Scholars and advocates criticize the PDA for wrongly assuming that 
intentional discrimination is the primary barrier facing working women who 
choose to have children.209  Instead, advocates argue that effective workplace 
laws must require employers to accommodate women during both pregnancy 
and afterward to enable them to retain and flourish in their employment.210 
By providing an accommodation for breastfeeding workers to express at work, 
it could be argued that the PPACA attempts to address the sex-based 
discrimination experienced by working women who are pregnant or mothers.  
The PPACA provides the accommodation to minimize absence from the 
workplace that the PDA does not211 by enabling breastfeeding mothers to return 
to work after giving birth.  However, the PPACA does not provide maternity 
leave, nor does it accommodate all pregnant workers.  Rather, it provides a 
workplace accommodation for mothers who choose to breastfeed for a limited 
time, not for all new mothers, and not for pregnancy or caregiving generally. 
Congress could have created a set of provisions to address systemic 
discrimination.  It could have required employers to provide daycare centers, 
paid parental leave, control over break time to all workers, or traditional 
antidiscrimination protection.  The PPACA’s approach is unique because it 
carves out a sub-group from a class of individuals that has experienced 
discrimination and provides it with accommodations that resemble traditional 
labor standards.  Additionally, the law defines membership in the protected class 
by voluntary, individual actions: the decisions to have children, to breastfeed, 
and to work.  By ensuring that mothers who breastfeed will not be fired for doing 
so, the law elevates this group of mothers above others.  A situation may arise 
in which an employer discriminates against a mother who has chosen not to 
breastfeed, while a mother in the same workplace who exercises her right to take 
 206. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: 
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2155 (1994). 
 207. Id. at 2155. 
 208. Id. at 2156; Dina Bakst, Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, 
at A25. 
 209. See, e.g., Heather Boushey, The Role of the Government in Work-Family Conflict, 
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall 2011, at 163, 171 (critiquing the PDA’s failure to require affirmative 
steps by employers). 
 210. See, e.g., Bakst, supra note 208. 
 211. See supra note 62.  But see Hudson-Plush, supra note 142, at 2968 (“Employment 
discrimination statutes set no such floor; they simply seek to remedy an inefficient social evil that 
exists in the workplace.”). 
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breaks to breastfeed is protected.  Separating this class of workers by individual 
choices they make about how to nourish their children will not improve 
workplace opportunities for all mothers or all caregivers.  It may, however, 
achieve its public health goal of promoting breastfeeding. 
The PPACA as enacted did not amend Title VII, which might  have integrated 
working mothers into the workforce more effectively.  Rather, the PPACA is a 
piecemeal approach, both in the protections it provides (accommodations 
without employment discrimination protections for a limited period of time) and 
the group of individuals that it protects (new mothers who choose and are able 
to breastfeed for up to a year).  Essentially, the PPACA defines a new class that 
deserves workplace protection: breastfeeding mothers.  However, it is difficult 
to argue that breastfeeding mothers as a group have experienced unique systemic 
discrimination that warrants accommodation. 
Nonetheless, many of the bills proposed before the PPACA contained 
employment discrimination protections.212  Some members of Congress believe 
that without clear protection, nursing workers will continue to experience 
discrimination without sufficient recourse.213  Consequently, calls to create this 
new class of protected workers continue.214 
In sum, the PPACA was not designed to address social inequity by 
accommodating sub-groups of classes of individuals who have historically 
experienced workplace discrimination.  Rather, it is a law intended to promote 
the specific act of breastfeeding, but also may address some aspect of 
discrimination against low-income working mothers.  By targeting a narrowly 
defined sub-group with accommodations to promote a specific behavior, the 
 212. See supra Part I.C. 
 213. For example, Senator Merkley, one the PPACA’s sponsors, expressed concern with the 
outcome of a state case that failed to offer antidiscrimination protection to nursing workers.  See 
Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 915 N.E.2d 622, 623 (Ohio 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting a claim 
brought by a nursing woman who was fired for unauthorized breaks she took to breastfeed, 
allegedly in violation of her company’s policy, fails because her failure to follow directions was 
not a pretext for pregnancy discrimination); see also LaNisa Allen, Comment on the Wage and 
Hour Division (WHD) Notice: Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers, REGULATIONS.GOV 
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=WHD-2010-0003-1715 (stating 
that she was fired for using a restroom break to pump her milk because it was becoming 
uncomfortable for her to keep working without doing so).  Senator Merkley highlighted the result 
in Allen while Congress debated the PPACA.  Senator Jeff Merkley, Why We Must Stand Up for 
the Right to Breastfeed, MOMSRISING.ORG (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.momsrising.org/blog/why 
-we-must-standup-for-the-right-to-breastfeed/ (“This ruling . . . reaffirms why it’s important that 
Congress include [the lactation provisions] in the health reform legislation.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, H.R. 1941, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(proposing to further amend the FLSA to extend the break time and space requirements for milk 
expression to exempt employees); Supporting Working Moms Act of 2013, S. 934, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (same); Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2011, H.R. 2758, 112th Cong. § 102 (2011) 
(proposing to define “because of sex” to include actions taken on the basis of lactation for Title VII 
purposes); Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2011, S. 1463, 112th Cong. § 102 (2011) (same). 
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PPACA fails to achieve the goal of employment discrimination law, which is to 
effectively address systemic social inequality. 
IV.  REJECTION OF THE PPACA’S PIECEMEAL PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The lactation provisions of the PPACA fit within the existing employment 
law that addresses social inequality through traditional labor standards and 
protections that increase access to the workplace for protected groups.  
Specifically, these provisions attempt to increase access to the workplace for 
low-income breastfeeding mothers who are hourly workers by providing unpaid 
time and a location to pump milk at work.  In theory, these protections enable 
these women to avoid being forced either to stop breastfeeding or to quit their 
jobs.  Instead, they can continue breastfeeding and remain employed.  Consistent 
with this theory is the reality that neither other federal and state laws nor most 
employers otherwise provide this type of leave.215  In this respect, the underlying 
goal of the PPACA is laudable, especially in light of the political compromises 
that are often necessary to pass a new labor standard or employment 
discrimination provision.216  However, the statute does not go far enough and 
consequently fails to fully achieve its goal. 
First, a public health law that offers a symbolic piecemeal approach may not 
be the best way to effectively promote individual rights or better conditions at 
work.  This problem, along with others that intersect with it, needs more than a 
statute that essentially provides only a congressional statement of support that 
employers should provide protections, support employees who choose to 
breastfeed, and help the government meet a public health goal.  By providing 
standard-like rights without an employment discrimination protection or 
effective enforcement mechanism, the statute does not provide sufficient 
protections.  The employee may only file a complaint with the Department if the 
employer denies or fails to provide the unpaid break time or location, and her 
potential damages are significantly limited.217  Consequently, the same group of 
women who are meant to benefit from the statute may be discriminated against 
because of their status as nursing mothers, without effective recourse.  The 
limited scope of protections and damages make it even harder for her to find a 
lawyer who would be willing to represent a nursing mother in any claims under 
the PPACA against her employer.218 
 215. Runge, supra note 176, at 472; see Breastfeeding Laws, supra note 65 (summarizing 
existing state laws that support breastfeeding). 
 216. See generally Chai R. Felblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace 
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Second, by only providing protection for the act of pumping milk, low-income 
working mothers may still be discriminated against for any other characteristic 
related to nursing or child care.  For example, if her employer perceives that she 
is taking too many calls from a child care provider with questions about her 
child, or that she is leaving too early because she needs to pick up her child from 
child care, or someone brings her child to her for suckling, she may be harassed 
or even fired, with limited recourse. 
Moreover, although the PPACA purports to protect low-income women by 
limiting the accommodation to hourly workers, it fails to protect them because 
the break time for pumping milk is unpaid.  This is an inherent disincentive for 
workers.  Further, given that the number of breaks and the location for pumping 
at the workplace is negotiable, the unequal bargaining power between an hourly 
worker and her boss, as well as the seemingly sexual nature—to some—of the 
language that necessarily must be used to ask for breastfeeding protections,219 
will discourage workers from asking for the necessary number of breaks or the 
appropriate space, for fear of angering their boss and/or being fired.  Hourly 
workers are almost exclusively at will, and they often live paycheck to paycheck, 
especially after a child is born and there are new expenses.220  To require an 
employee to take unpaid time to breastfeed at work and then to negotiate that 
time may be enough to cause some workers to stop breastfeeding rather than lose 
the income from their jobs or risk being perceived as a problem at work. 
Finally, many low-income women do not return to work after the birth of a 
child because the cost of child care exceeds their hourly wage or salary.221  The 
PPACA does not address this problem.  Some of the alternative solutions, if the 
goal is to ensure access to the workplace for low-income breastfeeding mothers, 
are to require employers to provide day care, pay for day care while the mother 
is breastfeeding, or provide paid parental leave. 
 219. See supra notes 39, 43, 44–49 and accompanying text (describing some of the harassment 
and embarrassment concerns nursing workers have or have experienced with breastfeeding at 
work). 
 220. See Dietrich, supra note 219, at 617 (discussing the connection between hourly work and 
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CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 2012 21 (2013), available at http://www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the creation of a new type of employment law by 
examining the breastfeeding at work provisions enacted in section 4207 of the 
PPACA.  On its face, section 4207 resembles other federal employment 
provisions given its shared roots and use of concepts from traditional labor 
standards and employment discrimination provisions.  However, upon closer 
examination, the combination of rights to break time and space to express milk 
at work, as well as the limitations on whether all employers must provide them, 
who is eligible to use them, and how an employee might enforce them or 
penalize an employer for violating them, are unique.  Despite the incorporation 
of an undue hardship defense for small employers, there is no traditional 
antidiscrimination provision in the PPACA, and any claim that the law is aimed 
at addressing historical systemic discrimination against breastfeeding women is 
weak, at best.  The sole goal of this law is to promote a specific type of 
breastfeeding by non-exempt working mothers to ensure that these women can 
breastfeed, including participating in the activity outside of work.  These limited 
labor standard-like provisions, in the form of time and space accommodation-
like requirements, for such a small subset of working mothers for a limited time 
represents a dangerous turn away from traditional efforts to use federal 
employment law to effectively address the broader goal of increasing access to 
the workplace for women and low-income workers. 
